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Abstract. CENC (Cipher-based ENCryption) is the recently designed
encryption mode for blockciphers. It is provably secure with beyond the
birthday bound. In this note, we present a simple distinguishing attack on
CENC, and show that the attack is the best attack for some parameter.
This proves the tightness of the security bound, and gives a partial answer
to the open question posed at FSE 2006.
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1 Introduction
There are many widely used blockcipher encryption modes, including CTR mode,
CBC mode, OFB mode and CFB mode. These modes are proved to be secure
with the standard birthday bound. That is, if n is the block length of the underly-
ing blockcipher, and σ is the total number of ciphertext blocks that the adversary
obtains, then the success probability of a distinguishing attack is O(σ2/2n) [1, 3].
The analysis is tight. There is an adversary that meets the security bound within
a constant factor, Ω(σ2/2n). This implies that there is no possibility that these
modes achieve beyond the birthday bound security, and therefore, the secret key
must be updated well before encrypting 2n/2 blocks of plaintexts.
CENC (Cipher-based ENCryption) was designed to overcome this security
limitation [2]. The design goals are: (1) beyond the birthday bound security, (2)
security proofs with the standard PRP assumption, (3) highly eﬃcient, (4) single
blockcipher key, (5) fully parallelizable, (6) allows precomputation of keystream,
and (7) allows random access. CTR mode achieves all the above goals except for
the ﬁrst one, while CENC improves the security of CTR mode without breaking
its important advantages.
It was proved in [2] that the success probability of a distinguishing attack
against CENC is O(wσˆ3/22n+wσˆ/2n), where w is a constant (default is w = 28),
and σˆ is roughly the same as σ. In [2] the tightness of the security bound was
posed as an open question. That is, the question is the existence of a distinguish-
ing attack with success probability Ω(wσˆ3/22n + wσˆ/2n), or the proof that the
security is better than the above.
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In this note, we present a simple distinguishing attack on CENC. The at-
tack is based on the observation on the keystream of CENC given in [2], and
the success probability is Ω(wσ/2n), where σ ≤ 2n/2. The strategy is straight-
forward and obvious. However, it turns out that the attack is the best attack
since O(wσˆ3/22n +wσˆ/2n) is O(wσˆ/2n) when σˆ ≤ 2n/2, and hence it proves the
tightness of the security bound. This gives a partial answer to the open question
posed at FSE 2006 — the security bound, O(wσˆ3/22n + wσˆ/2n), is tight for
σ ≤ 2n/2.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. If x is a string then |x| denotes its length in bits. If x and y are two
equal-length strings, then x⊕y denotes the xor of x and y. If x and y are strings,
then x‖y denotes their concatenation. Let x ← y denote the assignment of y to
x. If X is a set, let x R← X denote the process of uniformly selecting at random
an element from X and assigning it to x. For a positive integer n, {0, 1}n is the
set of all strings of n bits. For positive integers n and w, ({0, 1}n)w is the set
of all strings of nw bits. For a bit string x and a positive integer n such that
|x| ≥ n, first(n, x) denote the ﬁrst n bits of x. For a positive integer n, 0n denotes
the n-times repetition of 0.
Blockciphers. The blockcipher (permutation family) is a function E : K ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, where, for any K ∈ K, E(K, ·) = EK(·) is a permutation
on {0, 1}n. The positive integer n is the block length and an n-bit string is
called a block. If K = {0, 1}k, then k is the key length.
Let Perm(n) denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1}n. This set can be
viewed as a blockcipher by considering that each permutation is speciﬁed by a
unique string. We say P is a random permutation if P R← Perm(n).
The frame, nonce, and counter. CENC takes a positive integer w as a parameter,
and it is called a frame width. For ﬁxed positive integer w ≥ 1 (say, w = 28), a
w-block string is called a frame. A nonce N is a bit string, where for each pair
of key and plaintext, it is used only once. The length of the nonce is denoted by
nonce, and it is at most the block length. CENC also uses an n-bit string called
a counter, ctr. This value is initialized based on the value of the nonce, then it
is incremented after each blockcipher invocation. The function for increment is
denoted by inc(·). It takes an n-bit string x (possibly a counter) and returns the
incremented x. We assume inc(x) = x + 1 mod 2n, but other implementations
also work, e.g., with LFSRs if x 	= 0n.
3 CENC: Cipher-based ENCryption
CENC takes three parameters, a blockcipher, a nonce length, and a frame width.
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Algorithm CENC.EncK(N,M)
100 ctr ← (N‖0n−nonce )
101 l ← |M |/n
102 S ← CENC.KSGenK(ctr, l)
103 C ← M ⊕ first(|M |, S)
104 return C
Algorithm CENC.DecK(N, C)
200 ctr ← (N‖0n−nonce )
201 l ← |C|/n
202 S ← CENC.KSGenK(ctr, l)
203 M ← C ⊕ first(|C|, S)
204 return M
Algorithm CENC.KSGenK(ctr, l)
300 for j ← 0 to l/w − 1 do
301 L ← EK(ctr)
302 ctr ← inc(ctr)
303 for i ← 0 to w − 1 do
304 Swj+i ← EK(ctr)⊕ L
305 ctr ← inc(ctr)
306 if wj + i = l − 1 then
307 S ← (S0‖S1‖ · · · ‖Sl−1)
308 return S
Fig. 1. Definition of the encryption algorithm CENC.Enc (top left), the decryp-
tion algorithm CENC.Dec (bottom left), and the keystream generation algorithm
CENC.KSGen (right).
Fix the blockcipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, the nonce length nonce
and the frame width w, where 1 ≤ nonce < n. CENC consists of two algo-
rithms, the encryption algorithm (CENC.Enc) and the decryption algorithm
(CENC.Dec). Both algorithms internally use the keystream generation algorithm
(CENC.KSGen). These algorithms are deﬁned in Figure 1. A picture illustrating
CENC.KSGen is given in Figure 2. See [2] for more details of CENC.
Now we are interested in the security of CENC itself, and in the rest of
this note we assume that the blockcipher is ideally secure. That is, we assume
that the blockcipher is a random permutation P R← Perm(n), and we write
CENC.EncP (N,M), CENC.DecP (N,C), and CENC.KSGenP (ctr, l) where all
EK(·) in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are replaced with P (·).
4 Security of CENC
Security definition for CENC. We consider the strong security notion, which we
call indistinguishability from random strings.
An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm (a program) with access to an
oracle. Let A be an adversary with access to an oracle O(·, ·), which is either the
encryption oracle CENC.EncP (·, ·) orR(·, ·), and returns a bit. TheR(·, ·) oracle,
on input (N,M), returns a random string of length |CENC.EncP (N,M)|. We say
that A is a PRIV-adversary for CENC. Let (N0,M0), . . . , (Nq−1,Mq−1) denote
its oracle queries. The adversary is said to be nonce-respecting if N0, . . . , Nq−1
are always distinct, regardless of oracle responses and regardless of A’s internal
coins. We assume that any PRIV-adversary is nonce-respecting.
The advantage of PRIV-adversary A for CENC is
AdvprivCENC(A)
def=
∣∣∣Pr(P R← Perm(n) : ACENC.EncP (·,·) = 1)− Pr(AR(·,·) = 1)∣∣∣ .
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the keystream generation algorithm. This example uses w = 3
and outputs l = 7 blocks of keystream S = (S0, . . . , S6).
Security result on CENC. Let A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for
CENC, and assume that A makes at most q oracle queries, and the total length
of these queries is at most σ blocks, where “the total length of queries” is de-
ﬁned as follows: if A makes q queries (N0,M0), . . . , (Nq−1,Mq−1), then the total
length of queries is σ = 
|M0|/n + · · · + 
|Mq−1|/n, i.e, the total number of
blocks of plaintexts. The following information theoretic result was proved in [2].
Proposition 1. Let Perm(n), nonce, and w be the parameters for CENC. Let
A be a nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for CENC making at most q oracle
queries, and the total length of these queries is at most σ blocks. Then
AdvprivCENC(A) ≤
(w + 1)4σˆ3
w322n+1
+
(w + 1)σˆ
2n+1
, (1)
where σˆ = σ + qw.
If we use the rough inequality, w + 1 ≤ 2w, then we have the simpler
form, AdvprivCENC(A) ≤ wσˆ3/22n−3 + wσˆ/2n. Now if σˆ ≤ 2(n−3)/2, then we have
wσˆ3/22n−3 ≤ wσˆ/2n, while if σˆ > 2(n−3)/2, then wσˆ3/22n−3 > wσˆ/2n. There-
fore, the bound in (1) can be written as
{
AdvprivCENC(A) ≤ wσˆ/2n−1 if σˆ ≤ 2(n−3)/2,
AdvprivCENC(A) ≤ wσˆ3/22n−4 otherwise.
(2)
5 Distinguishing Attack on CENC
Let Perm(n), nonce, and w be the parameters for CENC, and ﬁx q ≥ 1 and
σ ≥ 1. For simplicity, we assume σ/w is an integer, but it is easy to handle the
general case.
Now we have an obvious observation on the keystream of CENC. That is, if
Si = (Si[0], . . . , Si[w − 1]) ∈ ({0, 1}n)w is one frame of the keystream of CENC,
then we always have Si[j] 	= Si[j′] for any j and j ′ such that j 	= j′. On the other
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PRIV-adversary A
100 M ← (0n)σ
101 N ← 0nonce
102 C ← O(N, M)
103 S ← M ⊕C
104 parse S into frames (S0, . . . , Sσ/w−1)
105 for i = 0 to σ/w − 1
106 if coll(Si) = 1 then return 1
107 return 0
Fig. 3. The nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary A for CENC.
hand, if Si is the truly random string, then Si[j] = Si[j′] holds with non-zero
probability. The above observation was given in [2, p. 315], and this leads to the
following simple distinguishing attack.
First, the adversary chooses any message of σ blocks M = (M0, . . . ,Mσ−1)
and asks M to receive C = (C0, . . . , Cσ−1), which is either the ciphertext of
CENC or the truly random string. Then the adversary retrieves the correspond-
ing keystream S = (M0 ⊕ C0, . . . ,Mσ−1 ⊕ Cσ−1). Now the adversary parses S
into σ/w frames, and searches for a collision in the frame. If there is a collision
in some frame, then C cannot be the ciphertext of CENC.
More precisely, let A be the nonce-respecting PRIV-adversary for CENC
deﬁned in Figure 3. In Figure 3, the oracle O(·, ·) is either the encryption oracle
CENC.EncP (·, ·) orR(·, ·), and “parse S into frames (S0, . . . , Sσ/w−1)” is deﬁned
by (S0, . . . , Sσ/w−1) ← S, where |Si| = wn for 0 ≤ i ≤ σ/w − 1. The collision
search function coll(·) takes the w block of string Si = (Si[0], . . . , Si[w − 1]) ∈
({0, 1}n)w as input, and the output is 1 if and only if Si[j] = Si[j′] holds for
some j and j′ such that j 	= j′.
Now if O(·, ·) is CENC.EncP (·, ·), then the output of the function coll(·) in
line 106 cannot be 1, and thus Pr(P R← Perm(n) : ACENC.EncP (·,·) = 1) = 0. On
the other hand, if O(·, ·) is R(·, ·), then S in line 103 is the truly random string
of σ blocks since C in line 102 is the truly random string. Since each Si is the
truly random string of w blocks, we have
Pr(coll(Si) = 1) = 1−
∏
0≤j≤w−1
(
1− j
2n
)
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
w(w − 1)
2n+1
≥ 0.3w(w − 1)
2n
and thus,
Pr(AR(·,·) = 1) ≥ 0.3w(w − 1)
2n
× σ
w
=
0.3σ(w − 1)
2n
since we have σ/w frames, and these frames are independent. Therefore, we
have AdvprivCENC(A) ≥ 0.3σ(w − 1)/2n. This implies that the bound (2) is tight
for σˆ ≤ 2(n−3)/2, since the bound in (2) is AdvprivCENC(A) ≤ wσˆ/2n−1, and hence
the above simple distinguisher is the best attack for σˆ ≤ 2(n−3)/2.
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6 Discussions and Conclusion
Another distinguisher. Another obvious observation on the keystream of CENC
is that, if S = (S0, . . . , Sσ−1) ∈ ({0, 1}n)σ is the keystream of CENC, then
we always have Si 	= 0n for any 0 ≤ i ≤ σ − 1. On the other hand, if S =
(S0, . . . , Sσ−1) ∈ ({0, 1}n)σ is the truly random string, then Si = 0n holds with
probability 1/2n. This observation was also given in [2, p. 315], but it does not
give us a better distinguisher than the one presented in Section 5.
Tightness of the security bounds. For any adversary against CENC, the advan-
tage is O(wσˆ3/22n+wσˆ/2n), which is O(wσˆ/2n) when σˆ ≤ 2n/2, and O(wσˆ3/22n)
when σˆ > 2n/2. We presented a simple distinguisher with advantage Ω(wσ/2n)
for σ ≤ 2n/2, and this implies that (1) the bound O(wσˆ3/22n + wσˆ/2n) is tight
when σˆ ≤ 2n/2, and (2) the simple distinguisher is the best attack for σˆ ≤ 2n/2.
The tightness of the bound for σˆ > 2n/2 is still open. Either we have a distin-
guisher with advantage Ω(wσ3/22n), or the bound O(wσˆ3/22n +wσˆ/2n) can be
improved. We conjecture that the bound can be improved to O(wσˆ/2n).
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